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Abstract 
This paper aims to provide new evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance. Unlike the previous empirical studies in the area of firm performance, we 
examine this relationship within a unique setting of publicly listed tourism firms. Our 
contribution is extended by investigating this relationship in Jordan as an emerging market 
and a famous tourist destination in the region. This is an interesting setting since ownership is 
more concentrated in the investigated firms. Our results show that institutional investors are 
self-opportunistic and negatively affect firm performance. In addition, we report a negative 
relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance. Furthermore, we detect that 
mutual funds have a positive impact on firm performance. Finally, the findings of this paper 
provide interesting empirical implications to academics and policy makers. 
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There is an increasing interest in the academic literature to examine the impact of ownership 
structure, as a corporate governance mechanism, on firm performance.  Most of these studies 
are focused on non-financial firms (more specifically manufacturing firms) in developed 
markets such as the US or the UK.  There is, however, limited evidence of this relationship in 
emerging markets. For example, Dyck and Zingales (2004) suggest that “the private benefits 
of control” is highly related to developing markets with more concentrated ownership. 
Lemmon and Lins (2003), using an East Asian sample, find that crises motivate insiders to 
take over “outside minority investors”. In addition, Al-Najjar (2011) detects that institutional 
ownership has an impact on firms’ financial policies (such as capital structure and dividend 
policy) in the Jordanian context. Chen and YU (2012) find that there is a non-linear 
relationship between managerial ownership and corporate diversification. However, there is 
no study that has investigated this issue in tourism related firms; we aim to bridge this gap in 
the literature.  
From international perspectives, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
provide empirical evidence that firms operating in countries with low legal protection and 
shareholder rights are subject to severe agency conflicts. McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
detect a positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm value. Lowenstein 
(1991) as well as Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) suggest that institutional ownership is 
associated with firms’ performance. On the other hand, Pound (1988) and Shleifer and 
Vishny’s (1986) argue that different shareholders have diverse agendas. This argument 
supports the findings of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that different ownerships can impact 
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firm performance in different ways. Using data from Germany, Oesterle, Richta, and Fisch 
(2013) detect a non-linear relationship between large shareholders and the internationalisation 
of the firm.  
This study examines the effect of ownership structure on the performance of Jordanian 
tourism publicly listed firms. In particular, we investigate the role of institutional ownership, 
foreign ownership, and mutual fund ownership on firm performance. Our aim is to examine 
the theoretical framework of agency theory within a weak governance structure. We 
contribute to the extant literature in different ways. First, unlike previous studies, we consider 
the effect of institutional ownership in tourism listed firms in Jordan, as a famous tourist 
destination in the Middle East. Despite the sufficient evidence of firm performance in tourism 
firms, there is no major study that investigates the role of ownership structure on tourism firm 
performance (see among others, Al-Najjar, 2014; Chen, 2010). We expect that this setting 
will be of interest since it is a specialised sector and hence the ownership structure will be 
more concentrated in such firms
1
. Secondly, we investigate if there is any effect of foreign 
ownership on firm performance in the publicly listed Jordanian tourism firms. Thirdly, the 
study analyses the impact of mutual fund ownership (as expert investors) on tourism firm 
performance. Finally, we control for the impact of the financial crisis in our sample. This is 
an important aspect since our sample contains listed firms in an emerging market. 
The remaining of this study is organised as follows; Section 2 highlights the tourism sector in 
Jordan; Section 3 shows the literature review, theoretical framework and hypotheses 
development; Section 4 discusses the data and methodology; Section 5 reports the findings; 
                                                 
1
 We compared the investigated ownership structure in our sample with a sample of manufacturing firms in 
Jordan. The average institutional ownership in our sample is significantly higher than the average of the 
controlled sample (.32) and lower for the government ownership (.021) and the foreign ownership (.08). 
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Section 6 includes further analysis of the institutional ownership effect; and Sections 7 
concludes. 
2. The tourism Sector in Jordan 
According to The Jordan Tourism Board, the tourism sector is one of the biggest contributors 
to the Jordanian economy, generating around $3.461 billion in 2010. This sector has managed 
to attract both domestic and international investments, leading to more job supply and 
providing the economy with the required hard currency. It is also reported that this sector 
represents 26% of the current account in the Balance of Payment. This ranks the sector in the 
third place after commodity exports and expatriate remittances. The tourism sector also 
represents 26% of the total service balance receipts as well as 13% of the GDP (Jordan 
Tourism Board Report, 2010). 
The Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report (2013) indicates that Jordan is placed sixth 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.  In addition to this, Jordan has moved 4 
places up in the world rankings of travel and tourism competitiveness from 64 in 2011 (out of 
140 countries) to 60 in 2012. This shows a fair development in the tourism sector and 
indicates that Jordan is seen to be in the top half of the world rankings. Moreover, it is 
indicated that Jordan is ranked 14 for prioritisation of travel and tourism and ranked 35 in the 
travel and tourism regulatory framework (Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report, 
2013).  
Jordan is famous as a tourist destination since it has a rich history and has many historical 
places. For example, Petra is one of the new Seven Wonders of the World and a UNESCO 
world heritage site. In addition, Qasr Amra and Umm ArRassas are UNESCO world heritage 
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sites. The lowest point on earth is the Jordan Valley, which is another important tourist 
attraction site as it includes the Dead Sea.  
Accordingly, it is important to shed light on the publicly listed tourism firms in Jordan and 
investigate the role of ownership structure in this context given the relatively weak 
governance environment there. For example, in our sample only a very few firms appointed 
independent directors on their boards. Hence, ownership structure might play an important 
role in firm performance.  
To recapitulate, even though the tourism sector in Jordan is so important, there is no major 
study to investigate the performance of publicly listed tourism firms. The aim of this study is 
to bridge this gap in the literature and to provide evidence on the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance in this context. Such relationship is under-
researched in both developed and developing countries. The importance of the Jordanian 
context is based on the view that major shareholders, such as institutional investors (including 
banks and mutual funds) as well as foreign investors can be seen as the key players in the 
market and affect directly firm financial performance.  
3. Literature review, theoretical framework and hypotheses development  
3.1 Literature review  
Several studies have focused on how ownership structure affects firm performance. This 
includes the role of blockholders such as institutional ownership and foreign ownership. It is 
argued that corporate blockholders provide firms with “fresh capital” that can be used to 
enhance growth. This capital, however, has a cost of losing control to the blockholders. This 
is because such blockholders will be interested in how the resources of the targeted firms are 
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allocated (Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010). From this view point, different 
studies have found a negative relationship between blockholders and firm performance (see 
for example, Rosenstein & Rush, 1990; Bogert, 1996). Demsetz (1983), however, supports a 
positive effect of ownership on firm performance, this is in line with the important 
monitoring role such blockholders have. McConnell and Servaes (1990), among others, also 
support the positive monitoring role of blockholders.  Thus, it is argued that despite the ample 
evidence about the relationship between ownership and firm performance, the results are far 
from being conclusive  (see for example, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; de Miguel et al., 
2004; Thomsen et al., 2006). 
Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007)  used meta-analysis based on 33 previous studies 
and report that there is no support of a positive linear relationship between blockholders and 
firm performance and hence no supporting evidence is found for the monitoring role of these 
investors. Similarly, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) also find that there is no relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance.  
As regards foreign ownership, Görg and Greenaway (2004) argue that the outcome of having 
foreign ownership is one of the most challenging issues in international business strategy. 
There are different studies that support a positive role of such investors in corporate 
performance (see for example, Wei, Xie, & Zhang, 2005). This is due to their effective 





Mutual funds ownership, as a specialised institutional investor, has been empirically 
investigated in the previous literature. These studies have reported that such investors can be 
seen as free from agency conflicts and hence have a positive impact on firm performance (see 
among others, Yuan, Xiao, and Zuo, 2008; Connet, Marcus, Saunders, &Tehranian, 2007).  
As regards tourism sector, we find lack of evidence on the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance. Al-Najjar (2014) asserts that corporate governance has a 
significant impact on firm performance. In particular the study reports the important role of 
board size and independence on firm performance without investigating ownership structure. 
In addition, Chen (2010) shows the importance of tourism growth in the hotel industry and 
argues that firm performance is related to “business cycle expansion”.  
From the above discussion, we can conclude that (as far as we know) there is no evidence for 
the role of ownership structure and firm performance in the tourism related firms. Thus, our 
study aims to bridge this gap in the literature.   
3.2 Theoretical Framework  
The majority of the previous related studies have adopted the agency perspectives or the 
monitoring standpoint in investigating the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance (see among others Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Morck et al., 1988; Classens et 
al., 2002). 
The agency theory is based on the separation between management and ownership that leads 
to the “principal- agent” relation. Such conflicts are related to the dissimilarity of risk 
attitudes between agents (managers) and owners (shareholders). Also, managers observe the 
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agency relationship as a short term relation, while shareholders look at it from a long term 
perspectives (Lambert, 2001; Al-Najjar, 2014).    
The theoretical framework for he ownership structure studies follows the positivist approach 
of the agency theory. Here, the relationship between principals and agents can be identified 
and the conflict is recognisable. Thus, ownership structure, as a corporate governance tool, 
can help in minimising the impact of this conflict (Jensen, 1986).  
The role of large shareholders in mitigating agency problems is well documented in the 
previous studies. For example, Ozkan (2006) argues that institutional investors have a key 
role in monitoring firms as they manage and control significant amounts of funds. In the same 
vein, Jensen (1986), Pound (1988) and Tong and Ning (2004) suggest that institutional 
owners can effectively monitor firms and can alleviate agency costs. This is what is known as 
the monitoring hypothesis (Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca, 2007).  
From another perspective, agency theory suggests that high concentration of ownership might 
result in ineffective decisions. For this viewpoint, there is a strategic alignment effect for such 
owners that will lead to a negative entrenchment effect within high blockholder ownership 
(see for example, Claessens el al., 2002; Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca,2007).   
The other standing point in the literature is the signalling theory, which is based on the 
asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. Large shareholders such as 
institutional investors might act as a transmitting information tool to other shareholders 
(Chidambaran & John, 2000; Gillian & Starks, 2002). Institutional investors can substitute 
firms need to signal good performance, for example, Short, Zhang, and Keasey (2002) 
suggest that such investors  minimise the need to use dividends to signal good performance.  
9 
 
Agency theory that is based on asymmetric information is not a new framework in the 
tourism context.  For example, Guilding, Warken, Ardill, and Fredline (2005) have employed 
this approach in their sample of tourism firms. Accordingly, our main framework in this 
study follows Guilding et al. (2005) and provides new evidence on the role of ownership 
structure in firm performance within this context. Qu, Ennew, and Sinclair (2005), using a 
survey analysis, investigate the relationship between ownership structure and market 
orientation in China using hotel and travel firms, as their sample. Our study complements Qu 
et al.’s, (2005) work by examining the role of ownership structure in the tourism context by 
employing advanced quantitative analysis.  
To summarise, there are different theoretical frameworks to investigate the role of ownership 
structure as a corporate governance tool as well as there are different explanations for such 
role within the same context. This might be one of the reasons behind the different findings in 
the empirical studies.  
3.3 Hypotheses development  
This section provides a discussion of our hypotheses; we start with our two main hypotheses 
related to institutional ownership and foreign ownership. Then, we introduce a hypothesis 
related to a special type of institutional investors (mutual funds), as an extra hypothesis to 
gain more understanding about the ownership structure in Jordan. 
Institutional ownership: As mentioned before, there are different studies that investigate the 
role of institutional ownership, McConnell and Servaes (1990), for example, detect a positive 
association between institutional ownership and firm performance. It is generally argued that 
the higher the level of institutional ownership will lead to better firm performance and value. 
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However, from Chinese perspectives, Wei et al. (2005) detect that both institutional 
ownership and state ownership are negatively related to firm performance.   
In order to develop our hypothesis as regards institutional ownership, we adopt the 
framework developed by Pound (1988). It is proposed that there are three hypothetical 
arguments for the role of institutional ownership. The first hypothesis is the efficient 
monitoring hypothesis, which indicates that institutional investors have the right background 
to monitor efficiently firms at a minimum cost. This will lead to a positive relationship 
between institutional investors and firm performance. The conflict of interest hypothesis, 
however, suggests that there is only a pure investment relationship between institutional 
investors and the firm. Hence, to keep this investment relationship, institutional investors will 
be reluctant to voice against the management on their decisions. This is clearly a conflict of 
interest situation that will inversely affect firm performance. The final proposition is the 
strategic alignment hypothesis, here, the argument is based on the mutual advantage of the 
cooperation between institutional investors and managers. This type of cooperation might 
reduce any beneficial effects on firm performance that could be developed from monitoring 
firms by institutional investors. Thus, a negative relationship is expected between 
institutional ownership and firm performance based on the strategic alignment hypothesis.   
Since we are investigating this issue in publicly listed tourism firms in Jordan that has 
somehow a weak governance protection, we argue that institutional investors will be more 
self-opportunistic and aim for their benefits and hence the conflict of interest hypothesis and 
the strategic alignment hypothesis will be more suitable in this context. This is also in line 
with Heard and Sherman’s (1987) argument that dual activities in business and investment 
relations will create a conflict of interest for such institutions. In addition, our sample has 
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more concentrated ownership (0.46) if compared to a controlled sample of manufacturing 
firms (around 0.32). Hence, with more concentration of such ownership the chances are high 
that these institutions will be self-opportunistic. In other words, these institutional investors 
might maximise their utility and deprive the income share for minority shareholders (see 
among others, Kuznetsov & Muravyev, 2001). Accordingly, we posit that: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. 
Foreign Ownership: To gain more understanding about the ownership structure, this study 
incorporates foreign ownership in the empirical models. Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) 
investigate the role of foreign ownership and suggest that foreign investors can be seen as a 
substitute for institutional owners. Hence, foreign ownership can complement the role of 
domestic institutional ownership in monitoring firms. It is also argued that having foreign 
directors among the board will help in increasing the productivity of the firm. Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) argue that foreign ownership can provide a positive informational 
impact on firm performance. In the same vein, Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) find a positive 
effect of foreign ownership in the Swedish context.  
We do not expect these shareholders to represent a majority ownership in our sample or even 
in the different industrial sectors in the Amman Stock Exchange, this is due to the emerging 
nature of the Stock Exchange. However, having such investors among the shareholders can 
provide the required pressure on management to improve firm performance as well as if a 
tourism firm has a significant foreign share ownership this might provide a good signal for 
the international connections required by such companies.  Accordingly, our hypothesis is:  
H2:  There is a positive relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance. 
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Mutual Funds: In order to further investigate the effect of institutional investors in the 
tourism-related firms in our sample, we examine the effect of mutual fund ownership on firm 
performance. These investors are professional investment institutions and their main aim is to 
maximise their profit. Thus, they will direct firms’ management if needed to improve their 
performance. Accordingly, we argue that these institutions will have less conflict of interest 
and will be more active in enhancing firm performance. 
Yuan et al. (2008) suggest that there is a positive relationship between mutual fund 
ownership and firm performance. This is because mutual funds do not have any relationship 
with the companies they invest in (portfolio companies) and hence their monitoring role can 
be described as “less pressure sensitive”. Therefore, to a large extent mutual funds can be 
described as “free from conflict of interest” (Yuan et al., 2008; Connet et al., 2007).  In 
addition to this, mutual fund managers are in a constant pressure to obtain good returns for 
their portfolios and thus mutual funds should have the right motives to monitor firms and to 
take the required actions to protect their investments (see among others, Yuan et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, we hypothesise that: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between mutual fund ownership and firm performance.  
To test these three hypotheses, we introduce two regression models. The first is related to 
institutional ownership and foreign ownership. In the second stage, we investigate the effect 
of mutual funds as our main independent variable to test our third hypothesis (for more 





4. Data, methodology and variables 
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
We employ a sample of publicly listed tourism firms in Jordan for the period spanning from 
2005 to 2012. These firms are related to hotels, entertainment facilities and transportation 
linked to tourism. Our population is all firms listed under tourism and transportation sector in 
the Amman Stock Exchange and provide the required financial information for the analysis 
period. Our sample represents 120 firm-year observations for 15 publicly listed firms. The 
population of tourism and transportation (general sector) includes 25 firms (13 Hotels and 12 
companies in the transportation sector). The 15 publicly listed tourism firms are those 
specialised in tourism and ‘transport and tourism’ purposes. Hence, our sample represents 
60% of the population. 
We hand-collect the financial data and ownership information from the annual reports to 
make sure of the data reliability and validity. Information about the annual reports is also 
available in the Amman Stock Exchange website. We then match this information with the 
available financial data in DataStream to make sure all the firm specific variables have the 
same reported values.  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics, the average institutional ownership is around 46%, 
indicating a high percentage of institutional ownership in the investigated firms. We detect a 
low average for foreign ownership; some of these firms do not even have such ownership. 
This reflects that foreign investors have a low share in firm ownership in our sample.  This 
low representation of foreign investors can be due to the emerging nature of the stock 
exchange. Hence, we argue that institutional investors are the major investors in publicly 
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listed tourism firms and that the foreign investors are expected to be less involved in 
providing any monitoring services. As regards mutual funds, the average ownership is around 
3% with a maximum of 60%, which might indicate the importance of such institutions. On 
average, our sample has a weak financial performance with around 5% profitability. In 
addition, these firms rely heavily on debt with an average debt to equity ratio of 57%. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
In Table 2 we report the correlations among the independent variables, there are no high 
bivariate correlations among the variables and hence multicolinearity is not of a concern in 
our models. We report a positive significant correlation between firm size and leverage. This 
result is expected since large firms would have more access to external funding opportunities 
(see among others, Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Another interesting finding is that there is a 
positive significant correlation between firm size and foreign ownership, indicating that the 
foreign investors are more interested in large firms.  It is worth noting that the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) is around 1 for all the variables, which confirms that multicolinearity is 
not a problem in our models.  
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
4.2 Methodology  
We have two empirical stages to test our hypotheses. In the first stage we investigate our two 
main hypotheses, by employing panel data models. We have 120 firm-year observations for 
15 tourism publicly listed firms. Thus, the study will use panel date modelling to investigate 
our hypotheses. We extend and modify the empirical modelling in previous empirical studies 
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such as Wei et al. (2005), Cornett et al. (2010), Chen (2010) and Al-Najjar (2014) and 
employ the following model to examine our hypotheses:  
Performanceit = β0 + β1 INSTit + β2 FORit + ψ firm-factors+ Financial crisis dummies+ εit 
Where performance is represented by two accounting based measures: return on assets and 
return on equity (see among others, Chen, 2010; Al-Najjar, 2014). INST is the institutional 
ownership measured by the percentage shares owned by institutions, FOR is the percentage 
of shares owned by foreign investors. Firm factors are: firm size, leverage and growth 
opportunities (market to book ratio). Financial crisis dummies are dummy variables 
representing the years of the financial crisis (2008-2012). The financial crises have received 
much attention in the literature and different studies have been conducted to empirically 
explore this effect. We expect the financial crisis period to have a negative impact on our 
sample as these firms will be directly affected by the reduction of the number of foreign 
tourists. In order to control for this effect in our models, we follow different studies that 
include the year effects for the financial crisis period in their models (see for example, Al-
Najjar, 2014; Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, & Rajan, 20082). 
An important issue when investigating the ownership structure is the endogeneity problem 
between ownership structure and firm performance. We run the Hausman test and the 
evidence was statistically weak for any possible endogeneity problem in the reported models. 
For extra robustness check we report the Instrumental Variable (IV) models using the 2SLS 
(Two Stage Least Squares) method in Table 5. 
                                                 
2
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008, p. 90) state that “if industries more dependent on external ﬁnance are hurt more 
severely after a banking crisis, then it is likely that banking crises have an independent negative effect on real 
economic activity”. Hence, if the real economic activity is down, this will have a direct impact on the tourism 
sector from both foreign and domestic tourists’ perspectives.  
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The second empirical stage aims to test our third hypothesis, we use the following panel 
regression model:  
Performanceit = β0 + β1 MUFit + ψ firm-factors+ Financial crisis dummies+ εit 
Where MUFit is the percentage shares owned by mutual funds and the other variables are 
previously defined. The main variable of interest, here, is MUF which we expect to be 
positive and statistically significant. 
It is worth noting that to correct for any heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems the 
robust standard errors are used in all the models. In addition, for our IV panel models we 
used 1 year lag for the endogenous variables as instruments. To check the validity of these 
instruments the Sargan test is employed. 
4.3 Variables  
The independent variables of concern, here, are institutional ownership, foreign ownership 
and mutual funds. As mentioned before, these variables are widely used in literature (see 
among others, McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Eng & Mak, 2003). We measure institutional 
ownership by the percentage shares owned by institutional investors to the total outstanding 
shares; Foreign Ownership is the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors; Mutual 
funds ownership is measured by the percentage of shares owned by mutual funds.  
With respect to Firm-Specific Variables, this study controls for firm Size, growth 
opportunities, and leverage; following Chen (2010) and Al-Najjar (2014), the study includes 
size and leverage as two important control variables. It is documented that large firms are 
more diversified and hence their values are likely to rise (this is because such firms have 
diverse capabilities and are more able to achieve economies of scale). In addition to this, 
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large firms can benefit from utilising their investment opportunities and improve their 
performance. Hence, firm size and growth opportunities are expected to be positively related 
to firm performance. Baek, Kang, and Park (2004) find a positive relationship between firm 
size and firm value. A similar result is reported by Chen (2010).  
Financial leverage reflects if creditors can mitigate agency conflicts (Lins, 2003; McConnell 
& Servaes, 1995). It is suggested that debt helps in enhancing firm performance (see, Chen 
Chung, Hsu, & Wu, 2010). On the other hand, leverage might indicate several financial 
problems and a high debt ratio can be seen as a signal for default problems or even 
bankruptcy. The pecking order theory expects a negative relationship between firm 
performance and financial leverage (Myers, 1984). 
Therefore, we argue that for our sample of publicly listed tourism firms, firm size and growth 
opportunities are positively related to firm performance, while leverage has a negative impact 
on performance. This is consistent with Chen (2010) who investigates the financial 
performance of hotels and argues that large firms with lower debt ratios have better 
performance.  
5. Results 
In this Section our regression findings are discussed. The study implies both panel data and 
pooled data models. The fixed effects model is not reported because the Hausman test is 
insignificant in all the models, indicating that the null hypothesis should be accepted and 
hence the specifications of the random effects are more appropriate than the fixed effects 
estimator.   
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We start with the first two main hypotheses. Table 3 provides the first set of regression 
models. Our dependent variable, here, is the return on equity. Models 1 and 2 represent the 
pooled models while Models 3 and 4 report the random effects model. In Models 1 and 3 the 
financial crisis dummies are included. We detect that there is a strong evidence of a negative 
significant relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance, and hence in 
our sample of publicly listed tourism firms, institutional investors have a conflict of interest 
as well as could have some strategic alignment with firm management. This finding is in line 
with our hypothesis (H1) and the conflict of interest hypothesis as well as the strategic 
alignment hypothesis. In addition, a negative relationship is reported between foreign 
ownership and firm performance in Models 1 and 2, this is contradicts our hypothesis (H2).  
This might be due to the lower stack such shareholders have in our investigated firms and 
thus such investors do not involve in monitoring activities. In the random effects models, the 
foreign ownership is insignificant, even though the statistical finding, here, is different than 
what is reported in the pooled models yet the empirical implication of the insignificant 
finding is in line with our explanation of the weak role of such investors in our sample. Thus, 
we provide evidence, in our sample that foreign investors holding a minimum stake in a firm 
tend not to act as a monitoring device, leading to a negative impact on firm performance.  
With respect to our firm specific factors, as expected, we detect a positive impact of both firm 
size and growth opportunities on firm performance. This indicates that for our sample of 
tourism listed firms, large companies with more growth opportunities outperform their 
smaller counterparts (Chen, 2010, Al-Najjar, 2014). In addition, leverage is negatively related 
to firm performance (Myers, 1984; Chen, 2010).  
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The financial crisis period has a negative impact on firm performance in 2011. This provides 
some evidence that our sample has been affected negatively by the financial crisis in that 
year. In addition to this, it is worth noting that this period witnesses the “Arab Spring” which 
might have a significant impact on the tourism sector in this region.  
The explanatory power of the reported models is (52%; 49%) in the pooled models (66%; 
63%) in the random effects models, indicating a good explanatory power in the reported 
models. The Lagrange Multiplier test is significant in all models, favouring the panel models.  
Our main conclusion of the results reported in Table 3 is that institutional ownership has a 
negative effect on the selected firms (operating in the tourism sector). This supports the 
evidence that these institutions might have a conflict of interest and hence will not act as a 
good monitoring device. Similarly, foreign ownership will not provide monitoring services 
(when they own minority shares) and thus will not improve firm performance. 
     PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Table 4 reports the results of the return on assets model. Similar to Table 3, there are four 
models. Models 1 and 2 represent the pooled models while Models 3 and 4 report the random 
effects models. To control for the financial crisis period, the corresponding year dummies are 
included in Models 1 and 3.  
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The results of Table 4 show some evidence of a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm performance. This result is statistically significant in Model 2. Hence, 
there is some evidence to support H1. This result is consistent with our previous findings, 
reported in Table 3 and the weak role of institutional investors as a monitoring tool. Foreign 
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ownership is negative and statistically significant in Models 1 and 2. This finding provides 
support for H2 and the weak monitoring role of these investors. Thus, our results are in line 
with the findings of Table 3.  
Our firm specific factors are statistically significant with the expected signs. Firm size and 
growth opportunities are positive and statistically significant, confirming the previous 
findings. In addition, financial leverage is negative and significant. The results are consistent 
with the findings of Chen (2010). The year dummy for 2011 is negative and statistically 
significant in Model 3. This is in line with the reported negative significant effect for year 
2011 in Table 3. 
The explanatory power of the pooled models is (41%; 39%) and (39%; 33%) for the random 
effects models, indicating relatively good explanatory power. Similar to Table 3, the 
Lagrange Multiplier is significant in all models  
Hence, our results in Table 4 confirm the weak role of institutional ownership and foreign 
ownership as monitoring tools and in turn on firm performance in the selected sample of 
Jordanian publicly listed tourism firms. In addition, we detect that in our sample, large firms 
with more growth opportunities have better performance if compared to smaller sized 
companies. Finally, high debt level can be seen as an index for having problems in paying 
back firms' obligations and thus leverage negatively affects firm performance. This result is 
also consistent with the pecking order theory.  
As a further robustness check, we take into account the endogeneity issue between ownership 
structure and firm performance. It should be mentioned that the Hausman test for endogeneity 
was not providing strong evidence that such a problem exists in all of the reported models.  
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We provide in Table 5 the IV random effects models with 2SLS technique. The dependent 
variable for Models 1 and 2 is return on equity and for Models 3 and 4 is return on assets.  
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
The results of Table 5 show a negative sign of institutional ownership in all the reported 
models, supporting H1. This result is in line with the previous findings. The foreign 
ownership variable is negative but insignificant in all the reported models.  Even though this 
statistical result contradicts with H2, yet its empirical implication is in line with the weak role 
of foreign investors in acting as a monitoring device to alleviate agency conflicts.  
As regards firm specific factors, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the previous 
findings. Year 2009, as a financial crisis period, has a negative impact on firm performance. 
Hence, there is some evidence that our sample of tourism firms has been affected by the 
financial crisis period (also, as mentioned before this period encounters the Arab Spring in 
surrounding countries). Similar to the previous findings the Lagrange multiplier is significant 
in all the reported models. Finally, it is important to note that the Sargan test is not significant 
in the reported models, indicating that our instruments (lagged ownership structure variables 
and lagged leverage) are valid.  
Since we are interested in the presence of foreign investors in our sample as well as the role 
of institutional investors, the study includes an interaction term that reflects the combined 
(interaction) effect of these investors. We report our findings in Table 6, which show that 
institutional ownership has the expected significant sign in Models 1 and 2, while foreign 
ownership follows the expected sign in Models 3 and 4. These results are in line with our 
previous findings. As regards the interaction effect, the results are not statistically significant 
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and hence we report no combined effect of such investors. Empirically, this indicates that 
foreign ownership is not providing any pressure on institutional investors to act as an active 
monitoring tool. The other results are consistent with the previous findings. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Thus, our results in this Section are robust and show the role of ownership structure on firm 
performance in our sample of tourism publicly listed firms. In addition, we report some 
evidence of a negative impact of the financial crisis period in tourism firm performance. 
6. Further analysis of the institutional ownership effect 
The results in the previous Section show that institutional ownership is not a key governance 
tool to mitigate agency conflicts in our sample. This provides evidence for the strategic 
alignment and the inefficient monitoring role of these investors. In order to further investigate 
this issue, we look into a specialised type of institutional investors, mutual funds.  
Table 7 reports these models, in which the dependent variable for Models 1 and 2 is return on 
equity and for Models 3 and 4 is return on assets. These models are the random effects 
models.  Models 1 and 3 consider the impact of the financial crisis. The standard errors are 
robust to control for any heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems.  
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
The results of the reported models show a positive significant sign for mutual fund ownership 
in Models 2 and 3. This result supports the effective monitoring role for such investors, in our 
sample. Thus, it is in line with our hypothesis (H3) and consistent with the efficient 
monitoring hypothesis proposed by Pound (1988). Equally, this can be explained by the less 
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concentration of these investors in our sample (on average 0.03) and hence they can be seen 
as a good monitoring device.  
In respect to firm specific factors, we report the same expected signs which are consistent 
with the previous findings in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Namely, size and growth opportunities are 
positively related to firm performance and leverage is negatively related to firm performance 
(see for example, Chen, 2010). The financial crisis period has a negative significant impact 
for the year 2011. This is also consistent with our previous reported findings.  
Finally, we investigate the nonlinear relationship between the ownership structure variables 
and firm performance by adding the squared values of these variables in our main equation. 
The results of the squared values are statistically insignificant and the other findings are 
similar to those reported in the previous tables. For parsimony, we do not report these 
models. Hence, there is a linear relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance, in our sample. 
Accordingly, we argue that institutional investors might have different roles in firm 
performance depending on the type of these institutions. More specialised investment 
institutions can act as a good monitoring tool and will have a less conflict of interest.  
7. Discussion and overall conclusion 
This paper aims to shed a new light on the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. Unlike the previous literature in the area of firm performance, we investigate 
this relationship in a unique setting of publicly listed tourism firms. Our contribution is 
extended by investigating this relationship in Jordan, as an emerging market. We have 
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selected Jordan, as a country of analysis, since it is considered as one of the main attraction 
sites in the Middle East.  
Given the weak governance environment and the high concentration of ownership (especially 
for institutional investors) in Jordan, we posit that institutional investors have a conflict of 
interest and hence will not be an effective monitoring device. To test our hypotheses, we 
employ panel and pooled models for 120 firm-year observations, representing 15 Jordanian 
listed tourism firms.  
Our results provide evidence that institutional investors have a negative impact on firm 
performance and hence this result supports the conflict of interest hypothesis and the strategic 
alignment hypothesis. In addition, foreign ownership has a negative effect on firm 
performance, supporting the view such investors are not active in monitoring firms. These 
results are robust when we control for any endogeneity problem between ownership structure 
variables and firm performance. Moreover, we find some evidence that our sample has been 
negatively affected by the financial crisis period. The study also investigates the role of 
foreign ownership and reports some evidence of its impact on firm performance. 
To gain more understanding of the relationship between institutional investors and firm 
performance, we look into more specialised institutions, namely, mutual funds. We expect 
these institutions to have a positive impact on firm performance since they are more expert in 
investment decisions and hence will have a more effective monitoring role. Our results 
support this positive relation.  
To recapitulate, we find supporting evidence that ownership structure has an impact on 
tourism firm performance. Institutional owners are found to suffer from conflict of interest 
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and hence have an inactive role in monitoring firms. However, when we investigate the role 
of mutual funds, we find that these specialised institutions have a positive impact on firm 
performance. Thus, different types of institutional investors might have different effects on 
firm performance in our sample.  
This study contributes to the tourism literature in different ways. First, we provide new 
evidence on the relationship between ownership structure (institutions, foreigners and mutual 
funds) and firm performance. This relation has not been examined before in such context. 
Second, the study analyses different types of institutional ownership and reports that the 
relationship might change depending on the type of such institutions. Thirdly, we empirically 
investigate the impact of the financial crisis period in our sample; this period encounters also 
the Arab Spring in some of the surrounding countries. Finally, we investigate, in more details, 
the Jordanian tourism context which has not been examined before. 
Similar to any other research investigating tourism sector, this study has some limitations.  
The sample size is small including 15 firms (120 firm-year observations). This sample, 
however, represents 60% of the public listed firms in the tourism and travel sectors. In 
addition, other internal corporate governance tools are not included, such as independent 
directors. We have searched for such information and found that most of the selected firms do 
not employ such directors.  
Finally, this study has several implications for the Jordanian policy makers and academics. 
First, better rules and regulations for corporate governance should be enforced. This would 
improve the monitoring role of institutional owners and to be a more efficient governance 
device. Second, policy makers in Jordan need to provide a better investment environment for 
foreign investors to be able to invest in the Stock Exchange. Third, managers of tourism 
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related firms should be aware of the risks associated with the financial crisis periods and how 
this might affect these tourism firms and hence more hedging techniques should be 
developed. Fourth, tourism related firms should develop more investment opportunities. This 
is because our results show a positive impact of growth opportunities on firm performance. 
Finally, this study can be seen as an attempt to investigate the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance in the tourism sector, further studies are required 
to increase our understanding of this relationship in different  ownership structure settings as 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROE 0.052 0.183 -0.934 0.475 
ROA 0.53 0.98 -0.25 0.40 
INST 
0.463105 0.221824 0.030133 0.999993 
FOR 0.009065 0.019215 0 0.077617 
MUF 
0.02551 0.097792 0 0.606813 
LEVERAGE 0.580985 0.829572 0.000533 5.08605 
SIZE 
17.16854 1.006244 14.2196 19.7689 
GROWTH OPP 
1.541345 0.998618 0.251052 8.16529 
Note: ROE is return on equity measured by net income divided by owners’ equity; ROA is return on 
assets measured by net income divided by total assets; INST is the percentage shares owned by 
institutional investors; FOR is percentage of shares owned by foreign ownership. LEVERAGE is 
total debt to equity ratio; SIZE is firm size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets;  and 


















Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
      INST             FOR       MUF            LEVERAGE SIZE Growth 
OPP 
INST 1      
FOR -0.0149 1     
MUF -0.238 -0.0808 1    
LEVERAGE -0.0061 -0.0122 -0.1004 1   
SIZE 0.022 0.3153*** -0.0473 0.4567 1  
Growth OPP 0.0651 -0.1888** -0.0517 -0.0172 -0.1282 1 
Note: INST is the percentage shares owned by institutional investors; FOR is the percentage shares 
owned by foreign investors; MUF is percentage shares owned by mutual funds; SIZE is firm size 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; LEVERAGE is total debt to equity ratio; GROWTH 
OPP  is the market to book ratio; ***,* *significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
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Table 3 Regression Analysis ROE 
             Model 1                             Model 2                          Model 3                            Model 4 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
INST -0.084* 0.052 -0.085* 0.052 -0.116** 0.060 -0.121** 0.061 
FOR -0.851* 0.486 -0.823* 0.477 -0.744 1.285 -0.869 1.225 
LEVERAGE -0.151*** 0.029 -0.158*** 0.033 -0.241*** 0.023 -0.245*** 0.021 
SIZE 0.070*** 0.017 0.071*** 0.018 0.091*** 0.026 0.095*** 0.025 
GROWTH OPP 0.060*** 0.021 0.063*** 0.022 0.046*** 0.014 0.051*** 0.014 
2008 0.019 0.036   0.035 0.029   
2009 0.034 0.042   0.042 0.029   
2010 0.000 0.038   0.002 0.029   
2011 -0.090* 0.048   -0.055* 0.032   
2012 -0.011 0.036   0.012 0.030   
Constant -1.096*** 0.272 -1.134*** 0.284 -1.380 0.456 -1.460*** 0.430 
R
2
 0.520  0.490  0.660  0.630  
LM     62.160***  53.940***  
Note: INST is the percentage  shares owned by institutional investors;   FOR is the percentage shares owned by foreign 
investors ;  LEVERAGE is total debt to equity ratio; SIZE is firm size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; and 




Table 4 Regression Analysis ROA 
                                       Model 1                             Model 2                          Model 3                            Model 4 
Roa Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
         INST -0.040 0.027 -0.042* 0.020 -0.025 0.028 -0.026 0.029 
FOR -0.531* 0.298 -0.546** 0.286 -1.009 0.699 -0.939 0.677 
LEVERAGE -0.066*** 0.010 -0.067*** 0.010 -0.061*** 0.011 -0.068*** 0.010 
SIZE 0.035*** 0.010 0.036*** 0.010 0.028* 0.015 0.029** 0.014 
GROWTH OPP 0.039*** 0.017 0.039** 0.016 0.014** 0.007 0.016** 0.007 
2008 0.021 0.023 
  
0.015 0.013 
  2009 0.018 0.027 
  
0.010 0.013 
  2010 0.002 0.029 
  
-0.007 0.013 
  2011 -0.012 0.022 
  
-0.026* 0.014 
  2012 -0.009 0.025 
  
-0.003 0.013 















 Note: INST is the percentage  shares owned by institutional investors;  FOR is the percentage shares owned by foreign 
investors;  LEVERAGE is total debt to equity ratio; SIZE is firm size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; and 





Table 5 IV Models 
                                                                ROE                                                                      ROA 
                                          Model 1                               Model 2                          Model 3                          Model 4 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
INST -0.190** 0.080 -0.180** 0.080 -0.063* 0.039 -0.061* 0.030 
FOR -1.049 1.693 -1.358 1.586 -0.855 1.044 -0.898 0.992 
LEVERAGE -0.245*** 0.024 -0.247*** 0.023 -0.060*** 0.012 -0.066*** 0.011 
SIZE 0.099*** 0.029 0.102*** 0.028 0.034*** 0.017 0.035** 0.016 
GROWTH OPP 0.049*** 0.015 0.054*** 0.015 0.017** 0.008 0.018** 0.008 
2008 0.051 0.033 
  
0.021 0.015 
  2009 0.056* 0.032 
  
0.015 0.015 
  2010 0.016 0.033 
  
-0.003 0.015 
  2011 -0.039 0.035 
  
-0.021 0.016 
  2012 0.030 0.033 
  
0.004 0.015 










 Sargan Test 0.04  0.015  0.048  0.013  
Note: INST is the percentage shares owned by institutional investors; FOR is the percentage shares owned by foreign investors;  LEVERAGE is 
total debt to equity ratio; SIZE is firm size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; and GROWTH OPP  is the market to book ratio;  
These models are IV random effects models; Sargan test is based on the time seriescross sectional models;  ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
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Table 6 the interaction effect of institutional ownership and foreign ownership 
 ROE ROA 
             Model 1                            Model 2                           Model 3                        Model 4 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
         
INST -0.098** 0.053 -0.089* 0.050 -0.021 0.028 -0.015 0.025 
FOR -0.572 1.278 -0.664 1.122 -1.011* 0.618 -0.916* 0.546 
INTER -0.041 0.055 -0.074 0.051 -0.008 0.024 -0.026 0.023 
LEVERAGE -0.245*** 0.041 -0.245*** 0.044 -0.061*** 0.009 -0.067*** 0.009 
SIZE 0.090*** 0.033 0.097*** 0.031 0.028 0.019 0.030* 0.017 
GROWTH OPP 0.047*** 0.015 0.052*** 0.015 0.014* 0.008 0.017** 0.008 
2008 0.036 0.026   0.015 0.010   
2009 0.042 0.030   0.010 0.013   
2010 0.005 0.031   -0.006 0.019   
2011 -0.048 0.035   -0.025* 0.015   
2012 0.017 0.023   -0.002 0.009   
Constant -1.375** 0.577 -1.486*** 0.531 -0.390 0.333 -0.426 0.297 
R
2
 0.670  0.630  0.390  0.330  
LM 59.600***  53.100***  168.570***  163.320***  
Note: INST is the percentage  shares owned by institutional investors;   FOR is the percentage shares owned by foreign investors ;  INTER is 
the interaction effect of institutional ownership and the existence of foreign investors (dummy variable that takes 1 if there is foreign ownership 
and zero otherwise) LEVERAGE is total debt to equity ratio; SIZE is firm size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; and 




Table 7 Regression Analysis Mutual Funds 
                                                                 ROE                                                                             ROA 
                                             Model 1                           Model 2                               Model 3                                   Model 4 
    Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Variable 0.116 0.090 0.065* 0.039 0.054* 0.031 0.030 0.025 
MUF -0.442** 0.185 -0.491** 0.200 -0.191** 0.069 -0.224*** 0.072 
SIZE 0.052 0.035 0.049 0.033 0.029* 0.018 0.028* 0.016 
LEVERAGE 0.039** 0.018 0.047** 0.020 0.015** 0.008 0.017** 0.008 
GROWTH Opp. 0.009 0.032 
  
0.013 0.012 
  2008 0.029 0.035 
  
0.010 0.014 
  2009 -0.002 0.035 
  
-0.006 0.018 
  2010 -0.129** 0.056 
  
-0.038** 0.015 
  2011 -0.005 0.026 
  
-0.001 0.010 















 Note: MUF is the percentage shares owned by mutual funds;  LEVERAGE is total debt to equity ratio; SIZE is firm size 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; and GROWTH OPP  is the market to book ratio;  LM is the Lagrange 
Multiplier test; ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
